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I. INTRODUCTION
Low (gross domestic product) GDP per worker goes together with low schooling. For example, in the country with the lowest output per worker in 2005, half the adult population has no schooling at all and only 5% has a college degree (Barro and Lee, 2010) . In the country with output per worker at the 10th percentile, 32% of the population has no schooling and less than 1% has a college degree. In the country at the 25th percentile, the population shares without schooling and with a college degree are 22% and 1%, respectively. On the other hand, in the United States (US), the share of the population without schooling is less than 0.5% and 16% have a college degree.
How much of the output gap between developing and developed countries can be accounted for by differences in the quantity of schooling? A robust result in the development accounting literature, first established by Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997) and Hall and Jones (1999) , is that only a relatively small fraction of the output gap between developing and rich countries can be attributed to differences in the quantity of schooling. This result is obtained assuming that workers with different levels of schooling are perfect substitutes in production (e.g., Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare, 1997; Hendricks, 2002) . Perfect substitution among different schooling levels is necessary to explain the absence of large cross-country differences in the return to schooling if technology differences are assumed to be Hicks-neutral.
There is by now a consensus that differences in technology across countries or over time are generally not Hicks-neutral and that perfect substitutability among different schooling levels is rejected by the empirical evidence, see Katz and Murphy (1992) , Angrist (1995) , Goldin and Katz (1998) , Autor and Katz (1999) , Krusell et al. (2000) , Ciccone and Peri (2005) , and Caselli and Coleman (2006) , for example. Once the assumptions of perfect substitutability among schooling levels and Hicks-neutral technology differences are discarded, can we still say something about the output gap between developing and rich countries attributable to schooling?
Taking a parametric production function approach to the development accounting literature requires assuming that there are only two imperfectly substitutable skill types, that the elasticity of substitution between these skill types is the same in all countries, and that this elasticity of substitution is equal to the elasticity of substitution in countries where instrumental variable estimates are available (e.g., Angrist, 1995; Ciccone and Peri, 2005) . These assumptions are quite strong. For example, the evidence indicates that dividing the labor force in just two skill groups misses out on important margins of substitution (Autor, Katz, and Kearney, 2006; Goos and Manning, 2007) . Once there are more than three skill types, estimation of elasticities of substitution becomes notoriously difficult for two main reasons. First, there are multiple, non-nested ways of capturing patterns of substitutability/complementarity and this makes it difficult to avoid misspecification (e.g., Duffy, Papageorgiou, and Perez-Sebastian, [2004] ). Second, relative skill supplies and relative wages are jointly determined in equilibrium and estimation, therefore, requires instruments for relative supplies. It is already challenging to find convincing instruments for two skill types and we are not aware of instrumental-variables estimates when there are 3 or more imperfectly substitutable skill groups.
We explore an alternative to the parametric production function approach and exploit that when aggregate production functions are weakly concave in inputs, assuming perfect substitutability among different schooling levels yields an upper bound on the increase in output that can be generated by more schooling. Hence, although the assumption of perfect substitutability among different schooling levels is rejected empirically, the assumption remains useful in that it yields an upper bound on the output increase through increased schooling no matter what the true pattern of substitutability/complementarity among schooling levels may be. This basic observation does not appear to have been made in the development accounting literature. It is worthwhile noting that the production functions used in the development accounting literature satisfy the assumption of weak concavity in inputs. Hence, our approach yields an upper bound on the increase one would obtain using the production functions in the literature. Moreover, the assumption of weakly concave aggregate production functions is fundamental for the development accounting approach as it is clear that without it, inferring marginal productivities from market prices cannot yield interesting insights into the factors, accounting for differences in economic development.
The intuition on why the assumption of perfect substitutability yields an upper bound on the increase in output generated by more schooling is easiest to explain in a model with two schooling levels, schooled and unschooled. In this case, an increase in the share of schooled workers has, in general, two types of effects on output. The first effect is that more schooling increases the share of more productive workers, which increases output. The second effect is that more schooling raises the marginal productivity of unschooled workers and lowers the marginal productivity of schooled workers. When assuming perfect substitutability between schooling levels, one rules out the second effect. This implies an overstatement of the output increase when the production function is weakly concave, because the increase in the marginal productivity of unschooled workers is more than offset by the decrease in the marginal productivity of schooled workers. The result that increases in marginal productivities produced by more schooling are more than offset by decreases in marginal productivities continues to hold for an arbitrary number of schooling types with any pattern of substitutability/complementarity as long as the production function is weakly concave. Hence, assuming perfect substitutability among different schooling levels yields an upper bound on the increase in output generated by more schooling.
From the basic observation that assuming perfect substitutability among schooling levels yields an upper bound on output increases and with a few ancillary assumptions-mainly that physical capital adjusts to the change in schooling so as to keep the interest rate unchangedwe derive a formula that computes the upper bound using exclusively data on the structure of relative wages of workers with different schooling levels. We apply our upper-bound calculations to two data sets. In one data set of nine countries, we have detailed wage data for up to 10 schooling-attainment groups for various years between 1960 and 2005. In another data set of about 90 countries, we use evidence on Mincerian returns to proxy for the structure of relative wages among the seven attainment groups. Our calculations yield output gains from reaching a distribution of schooling attainment similar to the US that are sizeable as a proportion of initial output. However, these gains are much smaller when measured as a proportion of the existing output gap with the US. This result is in line with the conclusions from development accounting (e.g., Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare, 1997; Hall and Jones, 1999; Caselli, 2005) . This is not surprising as these studies assume that workers with different schooling attainment are perfect substitutes and therefore end up working with a formula that is very similar to our upper bound. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II derives the upper bound. Section III shows the results from our calculations. Section IV concludes.
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Our calculations are closest in spirit to Hall and Jones (1999) , who conceive the development accounting question in terms of counterfactual output increases for a given change in schooling attainment. Other studies use mostly variance decompositions. Such decompositions are difficult once skill-biased technology and imperfect substitutability among skills are allowed.
II. DERIVATION OF THE UPPER BOUND
Suppose that output Y is produced with physical capital K and workers with different levels of schooling attainment,
where L i denotes workers with schooling attainment, i = 0, ., m. The (country-specific) production function F is assumed to be increasing in all arguments, subject to constant returns to scale, and weakly concave in inputs. Moreover, F is taken to be twice continuously differentiable. We want to know the increase in output per worker if schooling were to change from the current schooling distribution, s l to a schooling distribution s 2 with more weight on higher schooling attainment. For example, s l could be the current distribution of schooling attainment in India and s 2 , the distribution in the US. Our problem is that we do not know the production function F.
To start deriving an upper bound for the increase in output per worker that can be generated by additional schooling, denote physical capital per worker by k and note that constant returns to scale and weak concavity of the production function in equation (1) imply that changing inputs from (k l , s l ) to (k 2 , s 2 ) generates a change in output per worker y 2 -yl that satisfies (2) where F k (k l , s l ) is the marginal product of physical capital given inputs (k l , s l ) and F i (k l , s l ), the marginal product of labor with schooling attainment i, given inputs (k l , s l ). Hence, the linear expansion of the production function is an upper bound for the increase in output per worker generated by changing inputs from (k l , s l ) to (k 2 , s 2 ).
We will be interested in percentage changes in output per worker and therefore divide both sides of equation (2) by y l ,
Assume now that factor markets are approximately competitive. Then equation (3) can be rewritten as (4) where α l is the physical capital share in output and 1 w i is the wage of workers with schooling attainment i given inputs (k l , s l ). Since schooling shares must sum up to unity, we have
equation (4) becomes (5) Hence, the increase in output per worker that can be generated by additional schooling and physical capital is below a bound that depends on the physical capital income share and the wage premia of different schooling groups relative to a schooling baseline.
A. Optimal Adjustment of Physical Capital
In equation (5), we consider an arbitrary change in the physical capital intensity. As a result, the upper bound on the increase in output that can be generated by additional schooling may be off because the change in physical capital considered is suboptimal given schooling attainment. We now derive an upper bound that allows physical capital to adjust optimally (to be made clear shortly) to the increase in schooling. To do so, we have to distinguish two scenarios. A first scenario where the production function is weakly separable in physical capital and schooling, and a second scenario where schooling and physical capital are not weakly separable.
Weak Separability between Physical Capital and Schooling
Assume that the production function for output can be written as
with F and G characterized by constant returns to scale and weak concavity. This formulation implies that the marginal rate of substitution in production between workers with different schooling is independent of the physical capital intensity. While this separability assumption is not innocuous, it is weaker than the assumption made in most of the development accounting literature. 2 We also assume that as the schooling distribution changes from the original schooling distribution s 1 , to a schooling distribution s 2 , physical capital adjusts to leave the marginal product of capital unchanged, MPK 2 -MPK l . This could be because physical capital is mobile internationally or because of physical capital accumulation in a closed economy. 3 With these two assumptions, we can develop an upper bound for the increase in output per worker that can 2 This assumes that F in equation (6) is Cobb-Douglas, often based on Gollin's (2002) finding that the physical capital income share does not appear to vary systematically with the level of economic development. 3 See Caselli and Feyrer (2007) for evidence that the marginal product of capital is not systematically related to the level of economic development.
be generated by additional schooling that depends only on the wage premia of different schooling groups. To see this, note that separability of the production function implies (7) The assumption that physical capital adjusts to leave the marginal product unchanged implies that
. Substituting in equation (7),
Weak concavity and constant returns to scale of G imply, respectively,
where G i denotes the derivative with respect to schooling level i. Combined with equation (7), this yields (9) where the equality makes use of the fact that separability of the production function and competitive factor markets imply (10) Hence, assuming weak separability between physical capital and schooling, the increase in output per worker that can be generated by additional schooling is below a bound that depends on the wage premia of different schooling groups relative to a schooling baseline.
Non-Separability between Physical Capital and Schooling
Since Griliches (1969) and Fallon and Layard (1975) , it has been argued that physical capital displays stronger complementaries with high-skilled than low-skilled workers (see also Krusell et al., 2000; Caselli and Coleman 2002, 2006; and Duffy, Papageorgiou, and Perez-Sebastian. 2004) . In this case, schooling may generate additional productivity gains through the complementarity with physical capital. We therefore extend our analysis to allow for capital-skill complementarities and derive the corresponding upper bound for the increase in output per worker that can be generated by additional schooling.
To allow for capital-skill complementarities, suppose that the production function is
where, F, Q, U, and H are characterized by constant returns to scale and weak concavity, and G, by constant returns to scale and G 12 < 0, to ensure capital-skill complementarities. This production function encompasses the functional forms by Fallon and Layard (1975) , Krusell et al. (2000) , Caselli and Coleman (2002, 2006) , and Goldin and Katz (1998) for example (who assume that F, G are constant-elasticity-of-substitution functions, that Q(U, H ) -U , and that U, H are linear functions). 4 The main advantage of our approach is that we do not need to specify functional forms and substitution parameters, which is notoriously difficult (e.g., Duffy, Papageorgiou, and Perez-Sebastian, 2004 ).
To develop an upper bound for the increase in output per worker that can be generated by increased schooling in the presence of capital-skill complementarities, we need an additional assumption compared to the scenario with weak separability between physical capital and schooling. The assumption that the change in the schooling distribution from s 1 to s 2 does not strictly lower the skill ratio H/U, that is, (12) where, s 1 = [s O , ..., s T -1 ] collects the shares of workers with schooling levels strictly below τ, and s 2 = [s τ , ..., s m ] collects the shares of workers with schooling levels equal or higher than τ (we continue to use the superscript 1 to denote the original schooling shares and the superscript 2 for the counterfactual schooling distribution). For example, this assumption will be satisfied if the counterfactual schooling distribution has lower shares of workers with schooling attainment i < τ and higher shares of workers with schooling attainment i ≥ τ. If U, H are linear functions as in Fallon and Layard (1975) , Krusell et al.(2000) , Caselli and Coleman (2002, 2006) , and Goldin and Katz (1998) , the assumption in equation (12) is testable as it is equivalent to (13) where we used that competitive factor markets and equation (11) 
It can now be shown that the optimal physical capital adjustment implies
To see this, note that the marginal product of capital implied by (11) is (15) 4 Duffy, Papageorgiou, and Perez-Sebastian (2004) argue that a special case of the formulation in equation (11) fits the empirical evidence better than alternative formulations for capital-skill complementarities used in the literature. Hence, holding k/H constant, an increase in H/U either lowers the marginal product of capital or leaves it unchanged. As a result, k/H must fall or remain constant to leave the marginal product of physical capital unchanged, which implies equation (14).
Using steps that are similar to those in the derivation of equation (9), we obtain (16) where we used w i
where we used equation (14) . These last two inequalities combined with equation (11) imply (18) where β 1 is the share of workers with schooling levels i < τ in aggregate income. Hence, with capital-skill complementarities, the increase in output per worker that can be generated by additional schooling is below a bound that depends on the income share of workers with schooling levels i < τ, and the wage premia of different schooling groups relative to two schooling baselines (attainment 0 and attainment τ).
To get some intuition on the difference between the upper bound in equations (9) and (18), note that the upper bound in equation (18) would be identical to the upper bound in equation (9) if, instead of β 1 , we were to use the share of workers with schooling levels I < τ in aggregate wage income. Hence, as the share of workers with low schooling in aggregate wage income is greater than their share in aggregate income, equation (18) puts less weight on workers with low schooling and more weight on workers with more schooling than equation (9) (except if there is no physical capital). This is because of the stronger complementarity of betterschooled workers with physical capital. The main difficulty in estimating β 1 is defining threshold schooling τ. If τ is college attainment, the upper bound could be quite large because developing countries have very low college shares and the increase in college workers would be weighted by the physical capital income share plus the college-worker income share (rather than the much smaller college-worker income share only). If τ is secondary school, the difference with our calculations would be small.
Because obtaining estimates of β 1 is beyond the scope of the present paper, we focus on the upper bound in equation (9) rather than in equation (18).
B. The Upper Bound with a Constant Marginal Return to Schooling
The upper bound of the increase in output per worker that can be generated by additional schooling in equation (9) becomes especially simple when the wage structure entails a constant return to each additional year of schooling, (w i -w i-1 )/w i-1 = γ. This assumption is often made in development accounting, because for many countries the only data on the return to schooling available is the return to schooling estimated using Mincerian wage regressions (which implicitly assume (w i -w i-1 )/w i-1 = γ . In this case, the upper bound for the case of weak separability between schooling and physical capital in equation (9) becomes (19) where x i is years of schooling corresponding to schooling attainment i (schooling attainment 0 is assumed to entail zero years of schooling).
The upper-bound calculation using equation (19) is closely related to analogous calculations in the development accounting literature. In development accounting, a country's human capital is typically calculated as
where S is average years of schooling and the average marginal return to schooling, γ is calibrated off evidence on Mincerian coefficients. 6 For example, several authors use γ = 0.10, where 0.10 is a "typical" estimate of the Mincerian return. One difference with our approach is that typical development accounting calculations identify a country's schooling capital with the schooling capital of the average worker, while our upper-bound calculation uses the (more theoretically grounded) average of the schooling capital of all workers. The difference, as already mentioned, is Jensen's inequality. 7 Another difference is that we use country-specific Mincerian returns instead of a common value (or function) for all countries. More accurately, human capital is usually calculated as exp(γS), but the two expressions are approximately equivalent and the one in the text is more in keeping with our previous notation. schooling is small, the upper bound on the increase in output per worker that can be generated by more schooling depends on the Mincerian return and average schooling only
Another approximation of the right-hand side of (19) for small γ that is useful for relating our upper bound to the development accounting literature is γ(S 2 -S 1 )/(1 + γS 1 ).
C. Link to Development Accounting and Graphical Intuition
At this point it is worthwhile discussing the relationship between our analysis of schooling's potential contribution to output per worker differences across countries and the analysis in development accounting. Following Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997) , development accounting usually assesses the role of schooling for output per worker under the assumption that workers with different schooling are perfect substitutes in production. This assumption has been made because it is necessary to explain the absence of large cross-country differences in the return to schooling when technology is Hicks-neutral (e.g., Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare, 1997; Hendricks, 2002) . But now there is a consensus that differences in technology across countries or over time are generally not Hicks-neutral and that perfect substitutability among different schooling levels is rejected by the empirical evidence, see Katz and Murphy (1992) , Angrist (1995) , Goldin and Katz (1998) , Autor and Katz (1999) , Krusell et al. (2000) , Ciccone and Peri (2005) , Caselli and Coleman (2006) . Moreover, the elasticity of substitution between more and less educated workers found in this literature is rather low (between 1.3 and 2, see Ciccone and Peri, 2005 for a summary).
Hence, the assumption of perfect substitutability among different schooling levels often made in development accounting should be discarded. But this does not mean that the findings in the development accounting literature have to be discarded also. To understand why, note that the right-hand side of equation (9), our upper bound on the increase in output per worker generated by more schooling is exactly equal to the output increase one would have obtained under the assumption that different schooling levels are perfect substitutes in production,
Hence, although rejected empirically, the assumption of perfect substitutability among different schooling levels remains useful in that it yields an upper bound on the output increase that can be generated by more schooling.
To develop an intuition for these results, consider the case of just two labor types, skilled and unskilled, and no capital,
where G is taken to be subject to constant returns to scale and weakly concave. Suppose we observe the economy when the share of skilled labor in total employment is s 1, and want to assess the increase in output per worker generated by increasing the skilled-worker share to s 2 . The implied increase in output per worker can be written as (22) Weak concavity of G implies that G 2 (1 -s, s) -G 1 (1 -s, s) is either fiat or downward sloping in s. Hence, equation (22) Figure 1 illustrates this calculation graphically. 8 The increase in output is the light area. The upper bound is the dark area. The figure also illustrates that the difference between our upper bound and the true output gain is larger-making our upper bound less tight-the larger the increase in schooling considered. Source: Authors' illustration. 8 We thank David Weil for suggesting this figure. Our implementation of the upper bound considers the US schooling levels as the arrival value. As a result, the increase in schooling considered is large for many developing countries and our upper bound could be substantially larger than the true output gain.
It is worth noting that while weak concavity of the production function implies that the increase in output generated by more schooling is always smaller than the output increase predicted, assuming perfect substitutability among schooling levels. It also implies that the decrease in output generated by a fall in schooling is always greater than the decrease predicted under the assumption of perfect substitutability. Hence, our approach is not useful for developing an upper bound on the decrease in output that would be generated by a decrease in schooling.
III. ESTIMATING THE UPPER BOUNDS
We now estimate the maximum increase in output that could be generated by increasing schooling to US levels. We first do this for a subsample of countries and years for which we have data, allowing us to perform the calculation in equation (9). For these countries we can also compare the results obtained using equation (9) with those using equation (19), which assume a constant return to extra schooling. These comparisons put in perspective the reliability of the estimates that are possible for larger samples, where only Mincerian returns are available. We also report such calculations for a large cross-section of countries in 1990.
A. Using Group-Specific Wages
We implement the upper bound calculation in equation (9) for nine countries for which we are able to estimate wages by education attainment level using national census data from the international IPUMS (Minnesota Population Center, 2011). The countries are Brazil, Colombia, Jamaica, India, Mexico, Panama, Puerto Rico, South Africa, and Venezuela, with data for multiple years between 1960 and 2007 for most countries. The details vary somewhat from country to country as (i) schooling attainment is reported in varying degrees of detail across countries; (ii) the concept of income varies across countries; and (iii) the control variables available also vary across countries. See Appendix Tables 1-3 for a description of the micro data (e.g., income concepts; number of attainment levels; control variables available; number of observations). These data allow us to estimate attainment-specific returns to schooling and implement equation (9) using the observed country-year specific distribution of educational attainments and the US distribution of educational attainment in the corresponding year as the arrival value.
It is worthwhile noting that in implementing equation (9)-and also equation (19)-we estimate and apply returns to schooling that vary both across countries and over time. Given our setup, the most immediate interpretation of the variation in returns to schooling would be that there is imperfect substitutability between workers with different schooling attainments and that the supply of different schooling attainments varies over time and across countries. It is exactly the presence of imperfect substitutability among different schooling levels that motivates our upper-bound approach. Another reason why returns to schooling might vary could be the differences in technology. Our upper-bound approach does not require us to put structure on such (possibly attainment-specific) technology differences. Of course, our upper bound would be inaccurate if technology changes in response to changes in schooling. To the extent this is an objection, it applies to all the development-accounting literature. For example, the Hall-Jones calculation would be inaccurate if total factor productivity increases in response to an increase in human capital. However, our interpretation of the spirit of development accounting is precisely to ask about the role of inputs holding technology constant.
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The results of implementing the upper-bound calculation in equation (9) for each country-year are presented (in bold face) in Table 1 . For this group of countries applying the upper-bound calculation leads to conclusions that vary significantly both across countries and over time. The largest computed upper-bound gain is for Brazil in 1970, which is of the order of 150%. This result largely reflects the huge gap in schooling between the US and Brazil in that year (average years of schooling in Brazil was less than 4 years in 1970). The smallest upper bound is for Puerto Rico in 2005, which is essentially zero, reflecting the fact this country had high education attainment by that year (average years of schooling is almost 13 years). The average is 0.59. A different metric is the fraction of the overall output gap with the US that reaching US attainment levels can cover. This calculation is also reported in Table 1 (characters in normal type). As a proportion of the output gap, the largest upper-bound gain is for Brazil in 1980 (57%), while the smallest is again for Puerto Rico in 2005 (virtually zero). On average, at the upper bound, attaining the US education distribution allows countries to cover 21% of their output gap with the US.
The shortcoming of the results in Table 1 is that they refer to a quite likely unrepresentative sample. For this reason, we now ask whether using the approach in equation (19) leads to an acceptable approximation of equation (9). As we show in the next section, data to implement equation (19) is readily available for a much larger (and arguably representative) sample of countries, so if equation (19) offers an acceptable approximation to equation (9), we can be more confident on results from larger samples.
To implement equation (19), we first use our micro data to estimate Mincerian returns for each country-year. This is done with an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression using the same control variables employed to estimate the attainment-specific returns to schooling above.
11 See Appendix Table 2 for point estimates and standard errors of Mincerian returns for each country-year. Once we have the Mincerian return we can apply equation (19) to assess the upper-bound output gains of increasing the supply of schooling (assuming that technology remains unchanged). The results are reported, as a fraction of the results using equation (9), in the first row of Table 2 (bold type). This exercise reveals differences between the calculations in equations (9) and (19). On average, the calculation that imposes a constant proportional wage gain yields only 77% of the calculation that uses attainment-specific returns to schooling. Therefore, the first message from this comparison is, on average, basing the calculation on Mincerian coefficients leads to a significant underestimation of the upper-bound output increase associated with attainment gains. However, there is enormous heterogeneity in the gap between the two estimates, and in fact the results from equation (19) are not uniformly below those from equation (9). Almost one-third of the estimates based on equation (19) are larger. The significant average difference in estimates and the great variation in this difference strongly suggest that whenever possible, it would be advisable to use detailed data on the wage structure rather than a single Mincerian return coefficient. It is interesting to note that the ratio of equation (19) to equation (9) is virtually uncorrelated with per-worker GDP. To put it differently, while estimates based on equation (19) are clearly imprecise, the error relative to equation (9) is not systematically related to per-worker output. Hence, one may conclude that provided the appropriate allowance is made for the average gap between equations (19) and (9), some broad conclusions using equation (19) are still possible.
We can also compare the results of our approach in equation (9) to the calculation combining average years of schooling with a single Mincerian return in equation (20). The results are reported in the second row of Table 2 . On average, the results are extremely close to those using equation (19), suggesting that ignoring Jensen's inequality is not a major source of error in the calculations. However, the variation around this average is substantial. 
B. Using Mincerian Returns Only
The kind of detailed data on the distribution of wages that is required to implement our "full" calculation in equation (9) is not often available. However, there are estimates of the Mincerian return to schooling for many countries and years. For such countries, it is possible to implement the approximation in equation (19).
We begin by choosing 1990 as the reference year. For Mincerian returns, we use a collection of published estimates assembled by Caselli (2010) . This starts from previous collections, most recently by Bils and Klenow (2000) , and adds additional observations from other countries and other periods. Only very few of the estimates apply exactly to the year 1990, so for each country we pick the estimate prior and closest to 1990. In total, there are approximately 90 countries with an estimate of the Mincerian return prior to 1990. Countryspecific Mincerian returns and dates are shown in Appendix Table 3 . For schooling attainment, we use the latest installment of the Barro and Lee data set (Barro and Lee, 2010) , which breaks the labor force down into seven attainment groups, no education, some primary school, primary school completed, some secondary school, secondary school completed, some college, and college completed. These are observed in 1990 for all countries. For the reference country, we again take the US. (19), we also need the average years of schooling of each of the attainment groups. This is also available in the Barro and Lee data set. Figure 2 shows the results of implementing equation (19) on our sample of 90 countries. For each country, we plot the upper bound on the right side of equation (19) 40,000 50,000 60,000 70,000 80,000 90,000
Source: Authors' estimates. Table 3 shows summary statistics from implementing equation (19) on our sample of 90 countries. In general, compared to their starting point, several countries have seemingly large upper bound increases in output associated with attaining US schooling levels (and the physical capital that goes with them). The largest upper bound is 3.66, meaning that output almost quadruples. At the 90th percentile of output gain, output roughly doubles, and at the 75th percentile there is still a sizable increase by three quarters. The median increase is roughly by 45%. The average country has an upper bound increase of 60%. Figure 3 plots the estimated upper bounds obtained using equation (19) as a percentage of the initial output gap with the US. 13 Clearly the upper-bound output gains for the poorest countries in the sample are small as a fraction of the gap with the US. For the poorest country, the upper-bound output gain is less than 1% of the gap with the US. For the country with the 10th percentile level of output per worker, the upper-bound gain covers about 5% of the output gap. At the 75th percentile of the output per worker distribution it is about 7%, and at the median it is around 20%. The average upper-bound closing of the gap is 74%, but this is driven by some very large outliers. In Appendix Table 4 we also report summary statistics on the difference between the upper bound measure obtained using equation (19) and the upper bound obtained using equation (20) . While the difference is typically not huge, the measure based on equation (20) tends to be larger than our theory-based calculation. Since the latter is an upper bound, we can conclude that the calculation in equation (20) overstates the gains from achieving the attainment levels of the US.
IV. CONCLUSION
How much of the output gap with rich countries can developing countries close by increasing their quantity of schooling? Our approach has been to look at the best-case scenario: an upper bound for the increase in output that can be achieved by more schooling. The advantage of our approach is that the upper bound is valid for an arbitrary number of schooling levels with arbitrary patterns of substitution/complementarity. Application of our upper-bound calculations to two different data sets yields output gains from reaching a distribution of schooling attainment similar to the US that are sizeable as a proportion of initial output. However, these gains are much smaller when measured as a proportion of the existing output gap with the US. This result is in line with the conclusions from the development accounting literature, which is not surprising as many development accounting studies assume that workers with different schooling attainment are perfect substitutes and therefore end up employing a formula that is very similar to our upper bound. Income concept used in the analysis: wage income per hour worked for 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000, 2005. Other income concepts available: total income per hour worked for 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000, 2005 ; earned income per hour worked for 1990, 2000, 2005 (yield nearly identical results as income concept used. Control variables used in the analysis: age, age squared, gender, marital status, age*marital status, gender*marital status, dummies for region (metropolitan area) of residence, dummy for foreign born, dummies for race (only 2000, 2005 
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